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Stokes: Moving the Lines: The Common Law of Utility Relocation

MOVING THE LINES: THE COMMON LAW OF
UTILITY RELOCATION
Michael L. Stokes*
The system of streets and roads serving the United States is over four
million miles long and occupies about one percent of the country’s total
land mass—an area roughly the size of South Carolina.1 The most
obvious users of this intricate network are the cars and trucks that log
over 990 billion miles a year in vehicle-miles traveled.2 Less noticeable
are the utility lines, often located to the side of the pavement or
underground, that use these transportation corridors for tasks ranging
from transmission of fiber optic data to collection of sewage.
If a road is widened to allow for more traffic, or a city street is
rerouted for construction of a convention center, the utility lines may
have to be moved. This can be an expensive undertaking. During
construction of the Westpark Tollway in Houston, for example, the cost
to relocate electric and gas utilities exceeded $10 million.3 Telephone line
relocation for the same project cost another $1.5 million.4
Determining who has to pay these costs is a frequent source of
litigation, sometimes with inconsistent results. For example, in one 2006
decision resulting from the Westpark Tollway project, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that Texas statutory law would
require the government to pay for relocating electric and gas lines being
displaced by the new road.5 But three years later, in another case arising
from the same project, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Circuit’s “Erie guess about Texas law” was wrong, deciding that the
telephone company had to pay to move its own lines as required by
longstanding Texas common law.6
“Under the traditional common-law rule,” reaffirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1983 and recognized by the Court as far back as 1905,
“utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a
J.D., Ohio State University (1995); M.A., Industrial Relations, Wayne State University
(1983); B.A., Economics and Political Science, University of Michigan–Dearborn (1981). Mr.
Stokes is an attorney practicing in Toledo, Ohio.
1
Distance to Nearest Road in the Coterminous United States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, available at http://www.fort.usgs.gov/products/publications/
21426/21426.pdf.
2
Functional System Travel–2008, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., available
at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2008/pdf/vm2.pdf.
3
Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec., L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 436 F.3d 541,
542 (5th Cir. 2006).
4
Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth. v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 263 S.W.3d 48, 54 (Tex. App. 2006).
5
Centerpoint Energy, 436 F.3d at 551.
6
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 63–65 (Tex. 2009).
*
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public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local
But affected utilities, facing large and unwanted
authorities.”7
expenditures, have persistently found ways to argue around or against
this rule, and courts have sometimes been reluctant to apply it.
The abundance of litigation related to government-mandated utility
relocation is not surprising. When a government agency requires a
utility company to move its equipment from the right-of-way and
disclaims any responsibility to pay for it, the order might seem like an
uncompensated taking, and this argument commonly arises in utility
relocation cases.8 Moreover, utilities often have government-granted
franchises, dating to the late 1800s or before, that authorize them to put
equipment in the streets but say nothing about relocation.9 And because
utility companies are subject to a host of state and federal regulations,
they may urge that the common law rule is no longer valid because state
regulation has displaced it10 or federal law has preempted it.11 Finally,
given the amount of money at stake, it is predictable that utilities resist
uncompensated relocation and try to put the burden on the
governmental agency to justify it.12
This Article will begin by examining how the common law rule
developed as utilities began to use the streets and highways for gas and
water service and street railways, and then how the rule was affected by
the massive growth of the country’s federally-funded highway system.
Second, we will look at the various arguments made against application
of the common law rule and how they have fared. Third, we will
consider the particular issues that arise when private development and
government actions are intertwined in the project that made the
relocation necessary. Finally, this Article will suggest that a “clear
statement rule” would help sort out the legal complexities in this area:
Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S.
30, 35 (1983) (quoting New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197
U.S. 453, 462 (1905)).
8
See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler, 217 P.3d 424, 426–27 (Ariz. App. 2009); City
of Perrysburg v. Toledo Edison Co., 870 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ohio App. 2007); Sw. Bell, 282
S.W.3d at 60–61.
9
See, e.g., Qwest Corp., 217 P.3d at 427; Nw. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 711
P.2d 119, 128–30 (Or. 1985).
10
See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting
Qwest’s argument that state public utilities regulations displaced the common law rule).
11
See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
the argument that Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the common law
rule).
12
See, e.g., Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 502
F. Supp. 2d 747, 760–62 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Complaint by Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. against the
City of Manitowoc, 2008 Wisc. PUC LEXIS 239, *9 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisc. Apr. 18,
2008).
7
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because the common law “utility pays” rule is so well-established, it
should be applied unless a state statute clearly requires otherwise.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RULE
A. The Early Cases
Building and maintaining municipal streets and roads between
population centers is one of the “ancient purposes of organized
government.”13 For much of history, these ways were traveled by foot,
either human or animal. By the mid-1800s, however, street railway
systems began to operate, some horse-drawn and others powered by
electrical or steam engines. Unlike transient carriages or wagons, street
railways required fixed, permanent tracks, and the laying of these tracks
also laid the potential for conflicts with other uses of the road. Yet from
the earliest days, courts regularly determined that it was the secondary
user of the street, and not the organized government, that had to yield.
In 1863, for example, the Kentucky legislature authorized the city of
Louisville to contract for the construction of street railroads, and in 1864,
the legislature incorporated the Louisville City Railway Company to
build and operate street railways at locations authorized by the city
council.14 After agreeing with the city to the terms of a contract, this
privately-owned railway company laid over twenty-four miles of track—
costing nearly $400,000—and began operations.15
Soon afterward, however, the city decided to begin using different
pavement on some of its streets, notifying the company that it would
have to remove and replace 1280 yards of track on Jefferson Street as the
new paving progressed.16 The company did the work under protest and
sued to challenge the city’s action. On review, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals first had to determine whether the city could even require the
company to remove its tracks from the street. If so, the court would then
have to decide whether the city or the company should pay for it. To
answer the first question the court looked at the legislature’s 1863
enabling act, which required the “[city] council to reserve the right to
13
Hendricks v. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co., 6 S.W.2d 1050, 1052 (Ky. 1928); see
also Bester v. Chi. Transit Auth., 676 F. Supp. 833, 838 (N.D. Ill. 1987). “One of the most
ancient and habitually exercised functions of government for centuries has been providing
of roads and streets for use by the public and keeping them free from obstructions,
regulating traffic over and upon them, so that the public might get the maximum of safe
use thereof.” Superior Laundry & Towel Supply Co. v. Cincinnati, 168 N.E.2d 447, 448
(Ohio App. 1959).
14
Louisville City Ry. Co. v. City of Louisville, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 415, 417 (1871).
15
Id. at 418.
16
Id. at 418–19.
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regulate and control” the railroad.17 That reserved right, the court
decided, was broad enough to encompass the repaving project. As the
court put it, “the municipal government may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, make reasonable and proper regulations, prescribing the
manner in which this right of way shall be enjoyed.”18 And while the
city’s powers to regulate were expressly reserved in this instance, the
court also noted the “fundamental principle that these powers are
impliedly reserved . . . in all its grants of property to private
individuals.”19
Turning to the second question, the court held that the company
must bear the cost of relocating its tracks. The court based this decision
on a fundamental principle:
[just as the city] council could not by contract deprive
itself of the power to regulate the reconstruction of
railways made necessary by changes in the character of
pavements used upon the streets of the city, neither
could it embarrass or clog its right to exercise such
power by undertaking, either expressly or by
implication, to pay the expenses necessarily incurred by
the company in complying with the reasonable and
proper regulations made by the city upon this subject.20
Furthermore, the court declared that it would presume that the city acted
reasonably in exercising its legislative power.21
The Kentucky court’s decision also involved sub-surface rights:
specifically, the city of Louisville’s power to require the company to
remove its tracks (and replace them at its own cost) for a sewer project.
That relocation, too, was an exercise of the city’s inherent and inalienable
power to control the streets for the public benefit. As the court put it,
“we are of [the] opinion that the city did not and could not surrender its
right to construct sewers in such portions of its limits as might require
them, and that the railway company holds its right of way subject to this
power.”22
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421–22.
19
Id. at 422.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 423. The Alabama Supreme Court followed Louisville City Railway in an 1890
case ordering a water company to remove and lower pipes that conflicted with a city
sewer, even though the pipes allegedly were located as the city’s engineer had directed.
City Council of Montgomery v. Capital City Water Co., 9 So. 339 (Ala. 1890). Due to the
fact that liability for cost was not relevant to the mandamus action, the Alabama court
17
18
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During this same time period, courts in several other jurisdictions
used similar reasoning to determine that, franchise rights
notwithstanding, the government could order a utility to relocate at its
own cost whatever facilities it put in or under the public highways. In
1873, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that the county
commissioners could authorize a steam railroad to lay its tracks across
the tracks of a horse railroad when both occupied the same highway, for
both railroads “hold their rights to use [the highway] in subordination to
the power of the public authorities to determine what other use of it is
demanded by public necessity.”23
In 1883, one year after Thomas Edison installed his first small-scale
electricity distribution network in part of Manhattan,24 the New York
Court of Appeals held in In re Deering that the city of New York could
not assess property taxes to reimburse a gas company for expenses
incurred in removing and replacing an illuminating gas line that had to
be moved when the grade of the street was changed. Even though an
1848 act of the state legislature authorized the gas company to lay its
pipes under the public streets, the court held that “the company took the
risk of their location and should be required to make such changes as
public convenience or security requires, and at its own cost and
charge.”25
deferred ruling on whether the city was “under a moral or legal obligation to pay [the]
expense [of relocating the pipes],” but it signaled that the answer would probably be no.
Id. at 341. Quoting the Kentucky court’s opinion, the Alabama court indicated its approval
of the general principle that a city could not “embarrass or clog its right to exercise” police
power over the streets by undertaking to pay to relocate utilities using the public right-ofway. Id.
23
Lynn & Bos. R.R. Co. v. Bos. & Lowell R.R. Corp., 114 Mass. 88, 91 (1873).
24
PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID 29–39 (2007).
25
In re Deering, 93 N.Y. 361, 362 (1883). In 1892, the Supreme Court of Virginia followed
Deering and Louisville City Railway and refused to enjoin the city of Roanoke from lowering
the grade of a street, even though it meant that gas lines would have to be relocated.
Roanoke Gas Co. v. City of Roanoke, 88 Va. 810 (1892). The Virginia court suggested that
the utility had no valid claim for damages, for it accepted its franchise contract “with full
knowledge not only that the city retained the power to change the grade of its streets as in
its judgment and discretion the public welfare might require, but also of a probability of
such change in a new city such as Roanoke.” Id. at 818.
The Florida Supreme Court reached a similar result when it decided that a public
contract for a sewer system was void because the task of relocating utilities was included in
the description of the work being bid. Anderson v. Fuller, 41 So. 684, 688 (Fla. 1906). Thus,
[t]he city of Tampa was, therefore, not authorized directly or indirectly
to burden itself or its citizens with the cost of removing and replacing
of the water pipes, gas pipes, telegraph, telephone and electric light
poles, drains, or conduits, or railway tracks that might necessarily have
been interfered with in laying its sewers in the streets.
Id.
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Another illustrative decision—made by a federal court—arose in
Kansas City, Missouri, where a city sewer dug in 1884 displaced a water
line laid just one year before by the National Water-Works Company.
The water company contended that, because it had laid its water line in
the street “in the place and manner directed by the city,” it had acquired
“a vested property right in an undisturbed location and possession.”26
But the court disagreed, stating that under well-established law no city
could make a contract that abridged its full control of matters affecting
the public health.27 This rule governed the contract between the city and
the utility, which “took its right to lay its pipes in the streets of the city
subject to the paramount and inalienable right of the city to construct
sewers therein whenever and wherever, in its judgment, the public
interest demand.”28
By the end of the nineteenth century multiple utility lines in the
streets had become commonplace and so had the recognition that
governments could order those lines to be relocated at the cost of the
companies that owned them. As the Ohio Supreme Court’s 1893
Columbus Gaslight & Coke opinion held, any easement or other right that a
utility might have to use the streets “must give way to the paramount
duty of the city to care for the streets, and keep them open, in repair, and
convenient for the general public.”29 And so long as the city’s action was
not wanton or negligent, the utility would have to pay to move its lines.30
The court reasoned,
[t]his duty would be seriously interfered with if the city
could not change the grade of its streets save upon the
condition that it should make compensation to every gas
company, and water company, and telephone company,
and electric light company, and street-railway company,
for inconvenience and expense thereby occasioned. All
such agencies must be held to take their grants from the
city upon the condition, implied where not expressed,
that the city reserves the full and unconditional power to
make any reasonable change of grade or other
improvement in its streets.31

26
27
28
29
30
31
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Nat’l Water-Works Co. v. City of Kansas, 28 F. 921, 921, 922 (W.D. Mo. 1886).
Id. at 923.
Id.
Columbus Gaslight & Coke Co. v. City of Columbus, 33 N.E. 292, 294 (Ohio 1893).
Id. at 294.
Id.
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Nor were conflicts between multiple users of the road strictly an
urban phenomenon. In 1903, the commissioners of Sandusky County,
Ohio ordered a telegraph company to move its poles from the center of a
rural highway to the edge because heavily loaded farm wagons had to
dodge between them to avoid traffic on a recently installed electric
interurban railway.32 Because this highway was a federally funded post
road, the telegraph company asked the federal court to enjoin the order,
arguing that the federal statute deprived the commissioners of authority
to require it to move the lines—foreshadowing preemption arguments
made a century later. But then, as now, the federal government deferred
to local control of public road rights-of-way; the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the statute authorizing telegraph lines on federal
post roads “was not intended by its passage to interfere with the proper
control and regulation of such highways by the states, counties, or
municipalities, which had them in charge.”33
Alternatively, the telegraph company argued that because it had
paid the county for the right to use the highway and installed its poles
where it had been authorized to put them, it had “a right to maintain its
poles and wires where they are indefinitely.”34 But the federal appeals
court was not persuaded:
It is enough to say in reply to this, that the county
commissioners had no power to grant such a right or
franchise. Their power was limited. They had a right to
permit the telegraph company to maintain its poles and
wires in the road, provided they should not incommode
the public in its use, but that was the extent of their
power.35
Moreover, there was no guarantee that the poles could stay where they
were first installed. “A location not inconvenient when made, may
become so because of changed conditions; and whether it has or not,
must be ascertained by the commissioners in office when the inquiry is
made. No board has power to determine for all time just how a highway
shall be used.”36
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, two wellrecognized principles governed how utilities could use the public rightsof-way. First, the utility’s right to be there was a subordinate one, so the
32
33
34
35
36

Ganz v. Ohio Postal Tel. Cable Co., 140 F. 692, 694 (6th Cir. 1905).
Id. at 695.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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government authority responsible for maintaining the street or road
could order the utility to relocate its facilities. Second, this relocation
would be at the utility’s cost. To hold otherwise would “embarrass or
clog” public control of the roads and hamper the government’s ability to
respond to future public needs by making change too costly.37 And this
result was a fair one, because by using the public right-of-way the utility
company saved the time and money it would otherwise have spent
acquiring easements for its lines. The utility company took the risk of
locating its lines in the streets; therefore, it must also bear the cost of
moving them when the government required it.
It was against this background that the U.S. Supreme Court decided
New Orleans Gaslight, which has come to be considered a seminal
decision on the subject.
B. The Supreme Court’s 1905 New Orleans Gaslight Decision
The dawn of the nineteenth century saw some halting attempts at
providing water to the public through pipes laid in the streets,38 but the
first prototypical “utilities” were companies that produced and
distributed coal gas for illuminating streets and buildings.39 One of these
was New Orleans Gaslight and Banking Company, which was created in
1835 and given the right, for a term of years, to use the streets of New
Orleans as the city’s exclusive vendor of illuminating gas.40
The Gaslight Company first came before the Supreme Court in 1885
seeking to defend its exclusive rights against a legislatively sanctioned
competitor. The Court began its decision in that case by finding that the
grant of a monopoly was not improper because the company was not in
competition with ordinary citizens:

Supra note 22.
See ROBERT DALEY, THE WORLD BENEATH THE CITY 28 (1959) (stating that in 1799 the
Manhattan Company, headed by Aaron Burr, obtained legislative authority to provide
water to the city of New York). Moreover,
Burr and the Manhattan Company negotiated for the site of
Christopher Colles’ old well and reservoir adjacent to Collect Pond,
ordered thousands of feet of log pipe bored, and sent laborers into the
principal streets to break up the pavement. When the log pipes were
ready they were buried five feet down, two feet from the curb. For the
first time, New York City, like any growing organism, had pushed
roots down into the earth.
Id.
39
See id. at 116 (stating that New York City’s original gas charter was granted in the
spring of 1823).
40
New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 651–52 (1885).
37
38
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No one has the right to dig up the streets, and lay down
gas-pipes, erect lamp-posts, and carry on the business of
lighting the streets and the houses of the city of New
Orleans, without special authority from the sovereign. It
is a franchise belonging to the state, and, in the exercise
of the police power, the state could carry on the business
itself or select one or several agents to do so.41
But once it was built out, the utility franchise became a right; without the
assurance of an exclusive privilege for a fixed time, no private company
would have undertaken the risk of building a gas-works and laying the
distribution lines.42 Therefore, if the state legislature later decided that
such grants of monopoly power were a bad idea, it could revoke the
exclusive privilege. However, it could not revoke it under the guise of
the police power, for “the exclusiveness of a grant has no relation
whatever to the public health, or to the public safety.”43 Instead, it
would have to take the company’s exclusive right by eminent domain
and pay it just compensation in return.44
Having once successfully defended its rights against governmental
action, the Company probably felt it could do so again when a statecreated drainage commission ordered it to relocate some of its gas pipes.
So in the 1905 New Orleans Gaslight case, the Company argued that
having acquired the franchise and availed itself of the
right to locate its pipes under the streets of the city, it
has thereby acquired a property right which cannot be
taken from it by a shifting of some of its mains and pipes
from their location to accommodate the drainage system,
without compensation for the cost of such changes.45
But the Supreme Court drew an important distinction between the
franchise itself, in which the company had a compensable right, and the
particular location of its pipes in the streets, in which it did not. Unlike
the decision to disavow a state-chartered monopoly, the decision to
install a drainage system was an exercise of the police power, and that

41
Id. at 659–60 (quoting Crescent City Gaslight Co. v. New Orleans Gaslight Co., 27 La.
Ann. 138, 147 (1875)).
42
Id. at 670.
43
Id. at 672.
44
Id. at 673.
45
New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 458
(1905).
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power, “in so far as its exercise is essential to the health of the
community, . . . cannot be contracted away.”46 As the Court put it
[i]t would be unreasonable to suppose that in the grant
to the gas company of the right to use the streets in the
laying of its pipes it was ever intended to surrender or
impair the public right to discharge the duty of
conserving the public health. The gas company did not
acquire any specific location in the streets; it was content
with the general right to use them; and when it located
its pipes it was at the risk that they might be, at some
future time, disturbed, when the state might require for
a necessary public use that changes in location be
made.47
This paramount public right, moreover, extended beyond the surface
of the streets to the ground below because the public needed systems for
supplying water and light and removing sewage and storm-water.
Furthermore, “every reason of public policy requires that grants of rights
in [the] subsurface shall be held subject to such reasonable regulation as
the public health and safety may require.”48 Thus, “whatever right the
gas company acquired was subject, in so far as the location of its pipes
was concerned, to such future regulations as might be required in the
interest of the public health and welfare.”49 This view of the company’s
right, from the Supreme Court’s perspective, was “amply sustained by
the authorities.”50
In other words, “[t]he gas company, by its grant from the city,
acquired no exclusive right to the location of its pipes in the streets, as
chosen by it, under a general grant of authority to use the streets.”51 So
the drainage commission’s relocation order was not a taking of property;
rather, it was an exercise of the police power, and the expense the
company incurred gave no basis for a legal claim. The company had to
move its pipes to accommodate the drainage commission’s new public
work, and “[i]n complying with this requirement at its own expense,

46
47
48
49
50
51
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Id. at 461.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 462.
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none of the property of the gas company has been taken, and the injury
sustained is damnum absque injuria.”52
In the years that followed, the Supreme Court adhered to the
position it marked off in New Orleans Gaslight, distinguishing a utility’s
property right in its franchise from the permissive use of any given
location in the street. Thus, it was improper for the city of Louisville, in
a dispute over quality of a telephone company’s service, to repeal the
ordinance authorizing the company to install its lines in the streets, for
that would destroy the company’s franchise.53 Conversely, it would be a
proper exercise of the police power for a city to compel a railroad
company to move its tracks from one part of the street to another,
because “the franchise, and not the particular location, [is] the essence of
the contract” and though a franchise may not be destroyed under color
of the police power, its use may be regulated in the public interest.54
C. Utility Relocations and the Growth of the Highway Network
1.

Highway Expansion Before World War II

The number of automobiles in use in the United States increased
from four experimental vehicles in 1895 to 55,290 cars and trucks in
1904.55 By 1910, the number of registered motor vehicles increased to
468,500, and by 1920, it jumped to 9,239,161.56 Between 1915 and 1925,
automobile ownership went from one car per every sixty families to one
car per eight families.57
This increased use of automobiles brought with it an increased
demand for better roads and more involvement by the federal
government in the highway building process. In 1916, a federal highway
law was enacted that “provided substantial road funding to all States
52
Id. The Latin phrase means “[l]oss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense,” in
other words, “[a] loss or injury which does not give rise to an action for damages against
the person causing it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990).
53
City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649, 652, 663–64 (1912).
54
Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. City of South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 553 (1913). Notably,
Justice Lamar was the author of both the Grand Trunk and the Cumberland opinion.
Although the Supreme Court of this era was famously protective of contract rights, it
nonetheless recognized that the police power could not be contracted away and that even
major changes, such as the raising or lowering of a track, could be required. “[T]he
municipality had ample authority to make regulations necessitating changes of a nature
which could not have been compelled if the grant had been from it as a private proprietor.”
Id.
55
Spencer Miller, Jr., History of the Modern Highway in the United States, in HIGHWAYS IN
OUR NATIONAL LIFE 88, 95 (1950).
56
Id.
57
See SCHEWE, supra note 24, at 78.
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with highway departments. States without highway departments
quickly formed them.”58 This legislation was followed in 1921 by an act
creating a primary road system consisting of seven percent of the rural
highways in each State, which were eligible for federal-aid funding.59
Federal-aid was confined to highway construction in rural areas;
therefore, these projects “generally had little or no effect on existing
utility facilities.”60
When the New York legislature decided in 1936 to authorize
construction of a tunnel from Queens to midtown Manhattan, it elected
to create a Tunnel Authority to build the project with toll-financed
bonds61 because federal highway funds could not be used to build roads
in cities.62 Consolidated Edison spent over $535,000 to comply with the
Tunnel Authority’s order to relocate its facilities in public streets near the
tunnel approaches and then sued to recover the cost. Arguing that the
tunnel was not really a governmental function but a proprietary one,
where the Tunnel Authority was competing in a realm traditionally
occupied by private enterprise, Edison convinced a lower appeals court
that the Tunnel Authority should bear the relocation costs.63
This argument had some force to it, for since colonial days public
improvement projects traditionally were “carried out by private
companies or individuals designated by governments to serve the public
interest.”64 Toll roads and toll bridges, built and operated by private
companies under government charter, were a common feature of the
American landscape.65 As time went by, however, governments began
providing services such as water, sewer, electricity, and public
transportation, and the line between governmental and nongovernmental functions became ever more indistinct.66
To the New York Court of Appeals, it was not a close case; the
Authority was an agent of the State and the tunnel project was clearly a

FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., PUBLICATION NO. FHWA-SA-93-049,
HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE 6 (1993) [hereinafter HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE].
59
Id.
60
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., UTILITY RELOCATION AND
ACCOMMODATION: A HISTORY OF FEDERAL POLICY UNDER THE FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY
PROGRAM 2 (1980) [hereinafter UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION].
61
N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth. v. Consol. Edison Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 472, 476 (1946).
62
See HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE, supra note 58, at 6 (explaining that federal-aid highway
funds could not be spent for construction inside cities with a population of 2500 or more).
63
N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth., 295 N.Y. at 473.
64
ANDREW R.L. CAYTON, OHIO: THE HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 49 (2002).
65
See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848) (toll bridge); Custiss v.
Georgetown & Alexandria Tpk. Co., 10 U.S. 233 (1810) (toll road).
66
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J., concurring).
58
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public highway improvement.67 The mere fact that a toll was charged
did not make the tunnel a business enterprise. Instead, the imposition of
tolls created “a new class of taxpayers thought to be more justly charged
with the cost of the new improvement.”68 Accordingly, the court saw no
reason to depart from its then eighty-three year-old Deering precedent,
reiterating that the “‘fundamental common law right applicable to
franchises in streets’ is that a utility company must relocate its
facilities . . . when changes are required by public necessity.”69
2.

The 1944 Highway Act and Urban Expressways

Remarkably, despite economic depression and war, traffic volume
and the weight and speed of vehicles continued to increase throughout
the 1930s and 1940s.70 By 1941, some 34,472,000 motor vehicles were
registered in the United States.71 Responding to this growth, the FederalAid Highway Act of 1944 significantly increased the amount of federal
highway funds to be used for the federal-aid primary system (including
the newly authorized National System of Interstate Highways);
authorized the creation of a federally-aided system of secondary
highways; and for the first time allowed these highway systems to be
extended into cities.72
This significant expansion of the federal-aid highway system
increased the number and size of utility relocations, which led the
Federal Public Roads Administration to issue its first comprehensive
policy on using federal funds to pay for that work.73 Because utilities
occupy public rights-of-way pursuant to state law, the Administration
decided to leave it up to the states to determine if a utility had a right to
N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth., 295 N.Y. at 475–76.
Id. at 476.
69
Id. at 474–75. The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar result when asked to
determine whether the Chicago subway system was “governmental” or “proprietary.”
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 109 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. 1952). The court
concluded that providing ways for travel below the surface of the streets was a proper
street use and that the same rules governing use of the surface applied below ground:
“[t]he rights of the public remain paramount, and other owners, including utilities,
occupying such subsurface space do so subject to those rights.” Id. at 784. Citing New
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453 (1905), the Illinois
court came to the same conclusion: under the franchise agreement the gas company was
“subject at all times to the resolutions and ordinances of the common council of the city of
Chicago” and “[i]t had no vested right to have its facilities remain where they were.”
Peoples Gas Light, 109 N.E.2d. at 786.
70
HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE, supra note 58, at 6.
71
Miller, Jr., supra note 55, at 96.
72
UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 2.
73
Id. at 2–3.
67
68

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 2

470

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

be reimbursed for relocation costs. In its 1946 policy memorandum, the
Administration required each state to “make a formal finding as to the
extent that such utility company is obligated, or is relieved of the
obligation, by law or otherwise to move or to change its facilities at its
own expense.”74
Under this federal policy, the state first had to look to its statutes and
applicable franchise agreements or other contracts. If one of those
documents specifically reserved to the government the power to require
a utility to move at its own expense, then it would have to exercise that
power for the project to receive federal funding.75
If the relocation-cost issue was not specifically addressed by statute
or agreement, then federal highway policy indicated the state’s common
law rule would govern. Only if the common law did not require the
utility to pay its own relocation costs did the federal policy allow
reimbursement, and then only to the state government for “the cost of
such work actually paid by the State or its subdivisions.”76
Working within this framework, the Commonwealth of Kentucky
and Southern Bell Telephone submitted to the court a set of agreed facts
about a new urban freeway in Louisville: the Watterson Expressway.77
Southern Bell contended that Kentucky should pay its relocation costs.
Its 1886 state-wide franchise required the company to construct and
maintain its lines and poles “so as not to obstruct” the highways and
streets, and Southern Bell argued that it fulfilled this requirement by
properly locating its facilities when they were originally installed.78
The Kentucky Court of Appeals disagreed. In its 1954 decision, the
court reasoned that if Southern Bell’s interpretation of its franchise was
correct, then the state would have been required to design its highways
to avoid the company’s facilities rather than for the safety and
convenience of the traveling public.79 To the court, this result made no
sense, especially because state-paid relocation would amount to an
unconstitutional grant of the state’s credit to a corporation: accordingly,
the “not to obstruct” requirement must relate to new or improved
highways as well as completed ones.80

FED. WORKS AGENCY, U.S. PUB. RDS. ADMIN., GEN. ADMIN. MEMO. NO. 300,
REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS OF CHANGES TO UTIL. FACILITIES, P-3819 (1946) (reprinted in
UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 3).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.2d 308, 309–10 (Ky. 1954).
78
Id. at 310.
79
Id.
80
Id.
74
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Express language aside, the court determined that Southern Bell’s
franchise necessarily included an implied duty to relocate. Citing New
York City Tunnel Authority and its own 1871 Louisville City Railway
decision, the court stated, “we think there is a clearly implied condition
that [Southern Bell] may be required to remove and relocate its facilities
when such removal and relocation are in the interest of public
convenience or safety.”81
3.

Highway Legislation During the 1950s

Utility companies continued to press Congress for action, and
extensive hearings were held in connection with the 1952 and 1954
Federal-Aid Highway Acts.82 After the 1954 hearings, however, the
Senate Committee on Public Works expressed reluctance to alter the
existing common law pattern. Instead, it “tentatively concluded that,
since the question was governed by long-established state law, it was
‘neither feasible nor desirable for the Federal Government to give
direction to those local relationships by force of application of Federal
funds.’”83
The utilities also lobbied the states. In 1955, for example, the Maine
legislature enacted a statute requiring the Maine Turnpike Authority to
pay to acquire or relocate utilities on parts of the Turnpike that were
then under construction.84 But a group of bondholders sued to
invalidate the statute, arguing that it unlawfully changed the terms of
the Turnpike bonds they had purchased in 1953.85
Before reaching that argument, however, the Maine Supreme Court
had to determine whether funds could have been used for that purpose
under the original bonding arrangement. After a thorough review, it
agreed that “[t]he ‘fundamental common law right applicable to
franchises in streets’ is that a utility company must relocate its facilities
in the public streets when changes are required by public necessities.”86
As the Maine court explained:
[c]harters, franchises, statutory grants and permits
affording the use of public ways to utility locations are

Id. at 310–11.
UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 4.
83
Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S.
30, 39 (1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1093, at 13 (1954)).
84
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 136 A.2d 699, 717 (Me. 1957).
85
Id. at 717–22.
86
Id. at 710 (quoting N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth. v. Consol. Edison Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 474
(1946)).
81
82
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subservient, expressly or by implication, in the exercise
of governmental functions, to public travel and to the
paramount police power and relocation of utility
facilities in public streets or ways are at utility expense, a
common law liability unless abrogated by the clear
import of the language used in a particular instance.87
The court then considered Turnpike Authority’s powers:
Because of the state of the law authoritatively expressed,
without an affirmative grant from the legislature, the
defendant utilities when submitting to the police power
had no right to reimbursement for relocation of their
facilities installed in the public ways or for abandonment
of them. Conversely the Authority had no right to
reimburse the utilities without such legislative
sanction.88
Turning to the Authority’s enabling act, the court concluded that it
neither stated nor implied that the Authority may or must pay utility
relocation costs.89
Having determined that the common law rule prohibited the
Turnpike Authority from paying relocation costs, and having found that
the Authority’s enabling act did not change this rule, the court then
considered the 1955 amendment to the enabling act. That amendment,
the court determined, was unconstitutional because payment of the
utilities’ relocation costs “could be made only by diversion from
moneys” that had been pledged to pay off the bonds.90
In 1956, while the Maine litigation was still ongoing, Congress
enacted section 111 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act. That statute, now
codified at 23 U.S.C. § 123, was patterned on the existing practice of
reimbursing the States for money lawfully spent on utility relocation. As
a House committee report explained, that practice was being authorized
by statute “in order that there [would] be no question of the propriety of
so using Federal funds where a State under its own laws or practices
pays such costs on Federal-aid highway projects.”91 But as the report
was careful to point out, “[t]here is no requirement in this section, either
Id. at 711.
Id. at 715.
89
Id. at 716.
90
Id. at 720.
91
UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 5 (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 84-2022 (1956)).
87
88
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expressed or implied, that a State must pay all or any part of utility
relocation costs.”92
In addition, section 111 got rid of the requirement that states make
formal findings about how their existing laws would affect utilities
relocating from public rights-of-way. Instead, it stated that whenever a
state paid to relocate utilities for a federal-aid highway project, federal
funds could be used to reimburse it, unless “the payment to the utility
violates the law of the State or violates a legal contract between the
utility and the State.”93
This new provision resulted in a cascade of state legislation designed
to obtain federal dollars for utility relocation. Before passage of the 1956
act, only eight states had statutes authorizing payment of utility
relocation costs under certain circumstances.94 During 1956 and 1957,
however, bills providing for payment of relocation costs were introduced
in forty states, although only sixteen actually became law.95
Significantly, only one of these new laws authorized payment of
relocation costs on all state-maintained highways regardless of federal
funding.96 Five states limited reimbursement to federal-aid highway
projects, and the remaining ten limited it to projects on the Interstate
System, where federal reimbursement was at least ninety percent of the
total cost.97
In a 1958 report, “[t]he Senate Committee on Public Works expressed
concern over ‘this drastic change in existing practices,’ noting that ‘the
use of Federal funds for reimbursement to the States for this purpose will
increase substantially, thereby reducing the amount of Federal funds
available for construction of highways.’”98 The Committee considered
capping the funds available to states for reimbursement for utility
relocations, but the final bill backed away from this limitation, instead
providing that “reimbursement be made ‘only after evidence satisfactory
to the Secretary [of Commerce] shall have been presented to him
substantiating the fact that the State has paid such cost from its own
funds.’”99

Id.
Id. at 6 (quoting Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 111, 70 Stat. 383
(1956)).
94
Id. at 8. The states were California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Missouri, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Id.
95
Id. at 6.
96
Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S.
30, 40 n.17 (1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1407, at 28 (1958)).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 40 (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1407, at 28 (1958)).
99
Id. (quoting Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-381, 72 Stat. 94-95 (1958)).
92
93
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So after a decade of study and deliberation, “the relations between
utilities and the States were left, once again, to state law. No federal right
to reimbursement was ever granted to utilities, although pro rata federal
reimbursement remained available to the States if state law required
reimbursement of utilities.”100
D. The Uniform Relocation Act and the 1983 Norfolk Redevelopment
Decision
The continued expansion of federally funded highways in urban
areas, together with the development of federal housing and urban
renewal projects, led to an increasing number of people and businesses
that had to relocate, sometimes with little if any assistance.101
Responding to this problem, Congress passed the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, commonly
called the Uniform Relocation Act.102 This legislation applied to federal
agencies only, but state agencies had to provide equivalent relocation
assistance to qualify for federal funding, so many states adopted
legislation modeled on the Federal Act.103
Since the Act provided relocation assistance to displaced businesses
and included reimbursement of expenses in moving business property,
utilities began to seek payment for relocating their facilities from public
When federally assisted highway projects were
rights-of-way.104
involved, some courts held that specific utility relocation provisions of
the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act prevailed over the general relocation
assistance statutes.105 For other types of projects, most courts held that
the common law rule still took precedence because the broad general

100
Id. States stood to lose out if they erred in deciding whether state law required
reimbursement. Arizona v. United States, 494 F.2d 1285, 1287–88 (Ct. Cl. 1974). When
Arizona built an interstate highway through the Kaibab National Forest, it displaced a
natural gas pipeline that was installed pursuant to a terminable license from the U.S. Forest
Service. Id. at 1285. The Federal Highway Administration had previously approved
Arizona’s utility agreement with the pipeline company, in which the state undertook to
pay for the relocation. Id. at 1286. But the government later denied Arizona’s claim for
reimbursement, contending that under 23 U.S.C. § 123 the state had no legal obligation to
pay relocation costs. Id. at 1287. The Federal Court of Claims disagreed, noting that
although the Forest Service had the power to terminate the license and thereby cause the
pipeline company to remove its equipment for free, Arizona did not. Id. at 1288.
101
Norfolk Redevelopment, 464 U.S. at 36–37.
102
Id. at 32, 36–37.
103
Id. at 32.
104
Id. at 34–35.
105
See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. State of Del., Dep’t of Highways & Transp., 330 A.2d
432, 439 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
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definitions used in the relocation assistance statutes were not specific
enough to abrogate it.106
Other courts, however, believed that the federal and state relocation
assistance statutes signaled a shift away from the common law “utility
pays” rule. Arkansas, which had already limited the scope of its
common law rule to take advantage of federal reimbursement, truncated
it still further.107 And the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
applying the Uniform Relocation Act, found arguments against utility
relocation payments based on the common law unconvincing, declaring
that “[t]he Act was intended to create rights that were not recognized at
common law.”108
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, determined that the common law
rule still governed. In its 1983 decision in Norfolk Redevelopment, it
reversed the Fourth Circuit, unanimously holding that the Uniform
Relocation Act did not give businesses a new federal right to
reimbursement for expenses incurred in relocating utility lines in public
streets.109
The Court started with the common law rule, under which “utilities
have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public
right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local
authorities.”110 This rule had a long pedigree with the Court; it was
recognized and accepted beginning with New Orleans Gaslight in 1905.111
Next, the Court invoked “a well-established principle of statutory
construction” by which “[t]he common law . . . ought not to be deemed
to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for
this purpose.”112 This principle had even more weight in the case before
it, for “the elements of the federal law of eminent domain are largely
derived from the common law.”113
After laying this groundwork, the Court then turned to the
Relocation Act itself, observing that the provisions at issue were
106
See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. v. Costle, 615 F.2d 1147, 1148–50 (6th Cir. 1980); Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Glendale, 87 Cal. App. 3d 296, 299–301 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Boise Redevelopment Agency, 607 P.2d
1084, 1088–90 (Idaho 1980).
107
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 609 S.W.2d 914, 916–18 (Ark. 1980). One
justice thought the decision discarded the common law rule and should not have. Id. at
918–19 (Stroud, J., dissenting).
108
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Landrieu, 674 F.2d 298, 300 (4th Cir. 1982).
109
Norfolk Redevelopment, 464 U.S. at 33, 43.
110
Id. at 35.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 35–36 (quoting Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, 623 (1813))
(alteration and omission in original).
113
Id. at 36.
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modeled after the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act.114 Critically, however,
the utility’s reimbursement claims under the Relocation Act “would not
have been countenanced under the 1968 Highway Act. Utility relocation
costs necessitated by federally funded highway projects were already
specifically governed by a separate provision, 23 U.S.C. § 123, which
predated and was left intact by the 1968 Act.”115 That earlier law,
adopted as section 111 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, was the
product of much legislative consideration, and it did not create any
federal right to reimbursement of utility relocation costs.116 Instead, it
allowed pro rata federal reimbursement “to the States if state law
required reimbursement of utilities.”117
Subsequent federal highway legislation, including the model 1968
Act that first provided for relocation assistance to displaced persons, did
nothing to change the utility-relocation policy embodied in 23 U.S.C.
§ 123. This history, in the Court’s view, showed “that Congress
considered utility relocation costs and the expenses incurred by
‘displaced persons’ to be separate and distinct problems calling for
separate and distinct solutions.”118 Thus, “Congress showed that it was
aware of the common law rule that utilities must bear their own
relocation expenses, and it proved unwilling, after extensive
consideration and debate, to federalize the relations between utilities and
state and local governments.”119
Significantly, too, the Relocation Act repealed sections of prior law
that had been superseded but left 23 U.S.C. § 123 intact. This fact
confirmed to the Court that Congress did not intend to change existing
law with regard to utilities. The highway-related utility reimbursement
statute “was neither contradicted nor rendered superfluous because it
addressed a problem outside the scope of the Relocation Act.”120
Finally, the Court returned to the common law, noting that “Virginia
has continuously recognized the common law rule that a utility forced to
relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense.”121
Notably, too, the utility company “has always in the past borne all costs
of relocation and has included those expenses as part of its operating
expenses within the rate structure approved by the State Corporation

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
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Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. (citing Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Fugate, 180 S.E.2d 657, 658–59 (Va. 1971)).
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Commission.”122 These established practices underscored the Court’s
conclusion that the Relocation Act “did not grant utilities . . . a new,
federal right to reimbursement for expenses of the sort incurred here.”123
E. Consideration of the Developed Common Law Rule
The common law rule requiring utilities using a public right-of-way
to pay for their own relocation, upon request by the governmental
authority responsible for the road, developed along with the growth of
the utilities themselves. It is important to note that this rule applies only
to utilities in a public right-of-way. If the utility had obtained its own
easement, and a public project required relocation from that private rightof-way, the government would pay to move or accommodate the
facilities.124
But if the utility chose to use an existing public right-of-way to avoid
the time and expense of acquiring its own,125 then it must accept the risk
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43. In 1987, Congress enacted the Surface Transportation and Uniform
Relocation Assistance Act (“STURAA”). OFFICE OF PROGRAM ADMIN., FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN., PROGRAM GUIDE: UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION ON FEDERAL-AID
HIGHWAY PROJECTS, B-14 (6th ed. 2003), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/
utilguid/if03014.pdf. Section 405 of that Act amended the Relocation Act to allow for
payment of certain utility relocation expenses for facilities located on public property.
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17,
101 Stat. 132, 249–51 (1987). This amendment, however, was limited to utility relocations
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Federal law.” Id. According to the Federal Highway
Administration, the “otherwise provided” exception means that 23 U.S.C. § 123 is still
controlling for federal-aid highways. Id.
124
See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613, 623
(1935) (involving a gas transmission line within its own private right-of-way); City of
Grand Prairie v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 405 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that the
common law rule does not apply to telephone facilities “located in a private easement
acquired long prior to the planning, laying out and construction of the street”); Tennessee
v. United States, 256 F.2d 244, 263–64 (6th Cir. 1958) (explaining that government
reimbursement is required for relocation of thiry-eight utility poles installed on private
land, and there is no reimbursement for five poles installed within county road right-ofway). But see Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Outagamie Cnty., 752 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. Ct. App.
2008) (enforcing ordinance requiring utility that was replaced within zoning setback to pay
for relocation, even though the utility had its own easement).
Safety concerns might mean the utility had to pay for relocation, even if it had its own
easement. As the Panhandle Eastern Court noted, an existing utility will be required to
accommodate a new road at its own cost if its operation poses a danger to the public.
Panhandle E., 294 U.S. at 619, 622; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 254 U.S.
394, 409–12 (1921). In Panhandle Eastern, there was no safety issue; the state highway
commission had to pay for the accommodation because the buried gas line posed no
danger to traffic on the road. Panhandle E., 294 U.S. at 619.
125
The acquisition of a right-of-way can be quite costly. By way of illustration, Federal
Highway Administration data showed that during 2005 states spent over $1,750,000,000 to
122
123

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 2

478

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

that it might be required to relocate its facilities for some other public
use. As the New York Court of Appeals summarized it: “the company
took the risk of their location and should be required to make such
changes as public convenience or security requires, and at its own cost
and charge.”126
The other possibility—requiring the government to pay for
relocation when the public right-of-way is needed for some other
purpose—would have been unworkable for several reasons. First, as the
Ohio Supreme Court noted in its 1893 Columbus Gaslight & Coke decision,
street improvements would become impossibly expensive if each utility
using the right-of-way had to be compensated for the changes made to
its lines.127
Second, governments need to respond to changed conditions.
Although a utility line might have been unobtrusive when first installed,
it could become an obstruction with changes in the use of the right-ofway. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized in 1905,
“[a] location not inconvenient when made, may become so because of
changed conditions; and whether it has or not, must be ascertained by
the commissioners in office when the inquiry is made. No board has
power to determine for all time just how a highway shall be used.”128 If
the public had to pay for relocation, it would impede the government’s
ability to respond to new conditions by modifying how the public rightof-way is used.
Third, the need for flexibility is so important that, even if some shortsighted or improperly influenced governmental body did purport to
“determine for all time” how the public right-of-way would be used,
courts will not allow it. So, for example, although a city government
might agree to let a street railway company lay rails in the public ways, it
cannot contract away its power to change the pavement on those streets
or “embarrass or clog its right to exercise such power by undertaking,
either expressly or by implication, to pay the expenses necessarily
incurred by the company in complying with the reasonable and proper
regulations made by the city upon this subject.”129
acquire right-of-way for highway projects. NAT’L COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RESEARCH
PROGRAM, TRANSP. RES. BD., NCHRP REP. No. 625, PROCEDURES GUIDE FOR RIGHT-OF-WAY
COST ESTIMATION AND COST MANAGEMENT 7 (2009).
126
In re Deering, 93 N.Y. 361, 362 (1883).
127
Columbus Gaslight & Coke Co. v. City of Columbus, 33 N.E. 292, 294 (Ohio 1893).
128
Ganz v. Ohio Postal Tel. Cable Co., 140 F. 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1905).
129
Louisville City Ry. Co. v. City of Louisville, 71 Ky. 415, 422 (Ky. Ct. App. 1871). As
noted above, a utility company might have long-term franchise rights that could not be
abrogated by the government without payment of just compensation, but courts
distinguish between the franchise to use the streets and the particular location of the
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Fourth, allowing a utility to have preemptive rights in the location of
its facilities within the public right-of-way contradicts the very concept
of a street or highway. One nineteenth century Texas appellate decision
aptly described it as follows:
the fundamental idea of a street is that it is
public. . . . [T]hough private persons and corporations
are permitted to lay street-railway tracks, water, gas,
and steam pipes, as well as electric wires, in the streets,
because they so far contribute to the convenience and
accommodation of the public as to acquire a quasi public
character, yet these secondary, quasi public uses of the
street are, and of necessity must be, subordinate to the
other strictly public and primary uses of the street, and,
with a view to maintaining that subordination, a license
must be obtained from the municipal authorities (the
custodians of the street) before any such special and
quasi public use can be made of the street; and such
licensees can acquire no rights which are inconsistent
with this subordination.130
As courts have often observed, however, “[t]he strength and genius
of the common law lies in its ability to adapt to the changing needs of the
society it governs.”131 Not surprisingly, utilities have continued to urge
courts to limit or adapt the common law rule to better conform to their
interests. In the next section of this Article, we will examine those
arguments.
II. EFFORTS TO AVOID THE COMMON LAW RULE
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 Norfolk Redevelopment decision
affirming the common law rule, utilities have marshaled a number of
different arguments in an effort to avoid it. Those arguments fall into
several broad categories.
First, utilities argue that the project by which the utility is being
displaced is not “governmental” but “proprietary”—in other words, an
entry by the government into an area traditionally occupied by private
enterprise. Second, they contend that because the utility’s rates are
regulated by a specialized state agency and relocation costs affect rates,
company’s facilities in the streets, which can be changed by government order. Grand
Trunk W. Ry. Co. v. City of South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 553 (1913).
130
City of San Antonio v. San Antonio St. Ry. Co., 39 S.W. 136, 138 (Tex. App. 1896).
131
Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972).
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the common law has been abrogated. Third, utilities also argue that the
utility’s franchise statute or some other statute has preempted or
supplanted the common law rule. Fourth, utilities assert that there has
been a “taking.”
There is a fifth category, too, in which utilities contend that the
governmental action is being undertaken largely to benefit some private
entity, such as a developer. Because this category of cases raises some
unique and complex issues, it is treated in a section of its own.
A. Governmental/Proprietary Activity Cases
The idea of drawing a distinction between government activities
undertaken in a truly governmental capacity, as opposed to
“proprietary” activities, originated in tort law, where actions deemed to
be proprietary would not be shielded by sovereign immunity.132 In one
early case, for example, a court determined that when the city of New
York, acting pursuant to state legislation, built a dam on the Croton
River to supply clean drinking water to its residents, it was not immune
from liability for the resulting flooding because such dam-building was
typically done by private companies.133 The court reasoned that because
the activity was a proprietary one, the city stood “on the same footing as
would any individual or body of persons upon whom the like special
franchises had been conferred.”134
Even at that early date, however, the court confessed that the line
was hard to draw. For example, the Chief Judge explained, “there is
some difficulty, I admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly
distinguishing the one class from the other . . . [b]ut the distinction is
quite clear and well settled, and the process of separation practicable.”135
Later, this distinction was adopted in other legal contexts, where it
proved to be equally difficult to apply.136 Like Justice Stewart’s famous
“I know it when I see it” test for obscenity,137 however, the
governmental/proprietary distinction has persisted. Yet modern courts
have rejected it in utility relocation cases.
In Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland,138 for example, a
group of utility companies argued that Portland had no legal authority
132
City & Cnty. of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Colo.
1988).
133
Bailey v. Mayor of N.Y.C., 3 Hill 531, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
City & Cnty. of Denver, 754 P.2d at 1174–75.
137
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
138
711 P.2d 119 (Or. 1985).
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to compel them to relocate their facilities to accommodate construction of
a light rail transit system.139 The utilities “strenuously” urged that mass
transit was a proprietary function, and that by entering this field the city
put itself on the same footing as any other public utility—meaning that it
was not entitled to cost-free relocation.140
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, found the purported
distinction to be useless.
First, while some courts said that
“governmental” functions were those that are essential or necessary for
the government to perform (evidently in contrast to functions that are
optional luxuries), no court had ever found a governmental act that
failed this test.141 Second, other courts considered “governmental”
functions to be those that are traditional for the government to perform,
but changes in the economy and new public demands “change which
activities are traditionally and customarily engaged in by
government.”142 These weaknesses led the Oregon court to reject the
governmental/proprietary distinction, concluding that it was
“unworkable, untenable and unhelpful in deciding mass transit/utility
relocation cases.”143
The Colorado Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in its
1988 City and County of Denver v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. decision, which dealt with telephone lines under a city street that
were displaced by a sanitary sewer.144 Because the sewer benefited a
newly annexed subdivision and Denver had agreed to bear the cost of
installing it despite municipal regulations to the contrary, the phone
company argued that Denver was acting in a proprietary capacity and
should pay for the relocation.145 The lower appellate court was
persuaded by this argument,146 but the state’s high court was not,
concluding that the governmental/proprietary distinction was
“analytically unsound because it assumes that functions which were
once relegated to the private sector could not later be undertaken by
municipalities in support of the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens.”147 Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that “the

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id.
Nw. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 690 P.2d 1099, 1103–05 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
Nw. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 711 P.2d 119, 125 (Or. 1985).
Id. at 126.
Id.
754 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Colo. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
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governmental/proprietary distinction has no continuing validity in the
context of utilities relocation law.”148
Consideration of the principal opinion on which the utilities relied
shows why the governmental/proprietary distinction is unsound. In
1917, the city of Los Angeles decided to begin lighting its own streets.
Instead of just putting up its own street-lights, it decided to “clear a
‘space’” by ordering the incumbent franchisee to move its lights to other
locations.149 As it happened, the value of the franchisee’s right to light
the streets during the remaining term of the franchise was about $4000
while the cost to relocate its equipment exceeded $50,000.150 Since the
city was not attempting to revoke the franchise outright, its action
arguably came within the scope of the police power. 151 As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted, however, the federal district court could not find
any reason to exercise that power. The Court opined
[i]n what way the public peace or health or safety was
imperiled by the lighting system of the corporation or
relieved by its removal or change, the court was unable
to see and it is certainly not apparent. The court pointed
out that there were several lighting systems in existence
and occupying the streets and that there was no contest,
or disorder or overcharge of rates or peril, or defect of
any kind, and therefore concluded that the conditions
demonstrated that while the city might install its own
system there was no real “public necessity” arising from
consideration of public health, peace or safety requiring
the city to engage in the business of furnishing light.152
The Supreme Court also noted that the proper scope of the police
power “may be exceeded and so far as wrongful be restrained.”153 Wellestablished law already gave courts the power to stop arbitrary or
unreasonable acts by the government.154 Thus, whether Los Angeles’s

Id. at 1176.
City of Los Angeles v. L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 37 (1919).
150
Id.
151
Compare id. at 36 (stating that the ordinance did not attempt “absolute displacement”
of the franchised utility), with City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649,
663–64 (1912) (noting that the ordinance in question effectively revoked the utility’s
franchise).
152
City of Los Angeles, 251 U.S. at 38.
153
Id.
154
E.g., Atl. Coast Line. R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 559 (1914). In Atlantic Coast
Line, the Supreme Court stated the following:
148
149
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entry into the field of street-lighting was “proprietary” or
“governmental” added nothing to the analysis. Even if the act was
governmental, using the police power to muscle a franchisee out of the
way, absent any demonstrable public necessity, was an unreasonable act
that could be enjoined.
And that is exactly the conclusion reached by the Colorado Supreme
Court.155 Instead of struggling to decide whether a particular public
improvement was “governmental” (and therefore properly supported by
use of the police power) or “proprietary” (meaning the government
should stand on the same footing as a private actor), the court decided
the proper test was one of reasonableness.156 Accordingly, it held that “a
municipality may compel public utilities to relocate their facilities from
the public right-of-way whenever such relocation is necessitated by the
municipality’s reasonable exercise of police power to regulate the health,
safety, or welfare of its citizens.”157
B. “Regulated Utility” Cases
Since utility service in any particular area tends, by virtue of its
costly infrastructure, to be monopolistic in nature, utility companies
have long been subject to public regulation.158 Typically utilities obtain
approval of their rates, terms of service, and other business practices
through tariffs filed with the state regulatory agency. These documents
are massive,159 and the level of detail can be exacting. In 1916, for
[I]f it appear[s] that the regulation under criticism is not in any way
designed to promote the health, comfort, safety, or welfare of the
community, or that the means employed have no real and substantial
relation to the avowed or ostensible purpose, or that there is wanton or
arbitrary interference with private rights, the question arises whether
the law-making body has exceeded the legitimate bounds of the police
power.
Id. Moreover, in National Water-Works Co. v. City of Kansas, the Western District of Missouri
stated that “it may be that any malicious or unreasonable action by the city in the exercise
of the right to construct sewers . . . may be the foundation of a claim for damages.” 28 F.
921, 922 (W.D. Mo. 1886).
155
City & Cnty. of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Colo.
1988).
156
Id.
157
Id. (emphasis added).
158
See SCHEWE, supra note 24, at 69 (stating that in 1898, Samuel Insull, the head of
Chicago Edison and recently-elected president of the National Electric Light Association,
advocated public regulation of privately-owned utilities precisely because utilities tended
to operate as monopolies).
159
See DUKE ENERGY OHIO, P.U.C.O. NO. 19: SCHEDULE OF RATES, CLASSIFICATIONS RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR RETAIL ELECTRIC SERVICE OF DUKE ENERGY OHIO, 1 (2010), available at
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/emplibrary/files/docketing/tariffs/Electric/Duke%20Energy
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example, the Michigan Public Service Commission approved a tariff filed
by the Detroit Edison Company that included a company program of
supplying free replacement light bulbs to its customers.160 Because this
program was part of an approved tariff, the company could not
discontinue it before filing a new tariff and getting Commission
approval.161
Since the cost of relocating utility lines may ultimately affect the
rates charged to customers, utility companies have argued that their
approved tariffs must preclude efforts to force them to relocate
equipment in the public rights-of-way. In typical relocations, where the
utility is simply required to move its facilities, the tariff-based argument
has failed. But when the government has required the utility, as part of
the relocation process, to change the design of its facilities from aerial to
underground lines, the utilities have had somewhat greater success—at
least in requiring the government to pay the increased expense of
underground construction.
1.

“Like Kind” Relocations

A typical example of how a utility tariff might address the relocation
of facilities came up in a 1997 case involving the Maryland Stadium
Authority. Bell Atlantic-Maryland obtained approval of a tariff that
included the following terms: “[w]hen the Telephone Company is
requested to move or change existing construction, the customer or other
party requiring the move or change is required to pay the entire
cost . . . attributable to such relocation.”162 The Stadium Authority,
which was created by state statute to build and expand various public
venues, ordered Bell Atlantic-Maryland to move its equipment from
under streets that would be closed to expand Baltimore’s convention
center.163 Bell Atlantic-Maryland later sued to recover $110,000 in
relocation costs, claiming that its approved tariff took precedence over
the common law “utility pays” rule.164
The court rejected this claim for two reasons. First, even though the
Public Service Commission of Maryland had adopted the tariff, it was
“not the equivalent of the type of legislative act required to alter the
%20Ohio/PUCO%2019,%20Retail.%20Electric%20Tariff.pdf (showing that the Duke
Energy Ohio filing with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio in 2006 was 259 pages
long).
160
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 583 (1976).
161
Id. at 585.
162
Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Md. Stadium Auth., 688 A.2d 545, 552 (Md. 1997).
163
Id. at 547, 550.
164
Id. at 548, 551–52.
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common law rule.”165 Second, “even if the Tariff could be considered a
legislative directive,” its language did not “reverse[] the common law
rule because it contains no clear language demonstrating that it applies
to the government.”166
A similar result occurred in City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp.167 Qwest
filed a tariff that contained a statement that “[w]hen relocation or aerial
to underground conversion of existing facilities is requested or required
by law, the cost of constructing the new and removing the old facilities
will be borne by the customer or others requesting the relocation or
conversion.”168 Relying on this language, Qwest refused to relocate its
facilities, which in one instance resulted in a “telephone pole standing in
the middle of a newly-widened road.”169
The State of Washington, however, had a statute that allowed
telecommunications companies to use public rights-of-way “in such
manner and at such points as not to incommode the public use of
the . . . highway.”170 Resolving the case on the narrowest ground, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not have to decide whether the tariff
had the force of law or whether its ambiguous terms really did purport
to change the common law rule. Instead, the appeals court relied on the
principle that a tariff cannot supersede a statute, holding that “Qwest’s
tariff did not alter the long-established and unbroken rule established at
common law and in [the statute] that the utility company must pay
relocation costs.”171
2.

The Special Problem of “Undergrounding”

As the Ninth Circuit observed in City of Auburn, city governments
have been encouraging utilities with overhead lines (such as telephone
and electricity providers) to locate their facilities underground “for
aesthetic and safety reasons.”172 Utilities have resisted this trend in their
tariff filings, contending that underground lines are much more
expensive and that, if a utility has to bear this cost (and pass it through to
its customers) then “a customer in one city would be paying more
because some other city requires underground construction.”173

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 552.
Id.
260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1168.
State ex rel. Columbus S. Power Co. v. Fais, 884 N.E.2d 1, 2–3 (Ohio 2008).
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Accordingly, courts have had to decide conflicts between approved
tariffs, municipal ordinances, and the common law relocation rule. The
results have been mixed.
The city of Longmont, Colorado decided to put its own municipal
electric lines underground, and in 1993, it enacted an ordinance
requiring other users of its street utility poles to put their lines
underground as well.174 U.S. West, however, had an approved tariff
requiring the customer or “person requesting relocation” to pay for
undergrounding, and it contended that its tariff had the force of a
statute, trumping the contrary ordinance.175 The Colorado Supreme
Court did not agree that the tariff was equivalent to a statute, holding
that “[o]nly when some future contract, franchise agreement, or state
statute . . . specifically provides that the municipality must bear the
financial burden of relocating the facilities does the . . . exception to the
general common law rule requiring the utility company to pay for
relocation arise.”176
The court then went on to decide that the Colorado public utility
commission’s powers did not preempt municipal power to regulate
streets and determine when utility relocation is required.177 Finally, the
court said that although municipalities had to be reasonable in exercising
their power to order utilities to relocate, a reviewing court would apply a
presumption of reasonableness—and the facts in this case indicated that
the city ordinance was reasonable.178
The New Mexico Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in its
2003 decision in City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico Public Regulation
Commission.179 In that case, a group of cities appealed the state utility
commission’s approval of a tariff allowing a utility to recover costs
incurred in complying with local undergrounding ordinances.180 In a
nod to the utility commission, the court remarked that a local
improvement project based on aesthetics rather than public health and
safety concerns would “not trigger the common law rule of requiring
utilities to bear the expense of relocation.”181 Because the tariff applied
to all undergrounding projects, however, and did not exclude those
required by the interests of health and safety, the court held that it
“violate[d] the common law principle of permitting municipalities to
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
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U.S. W. Commc’ns., Inc. v. City of Longmont, 948 P.2d 509, 513 (Colo. 1997).
Id. at 514–18.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521–22.
79 P.3d 297 (N.M. 2003).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 301.
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require the utility to bear its own relocation expenses.”182 As in
Colorado, the New Mexico court also concluded that because the statute
creating its state utility commission “specifically provided that
municipalities and counties have the power to regulate the use of public
ways” and did not clearly abrogate the common law rule, the
commission lacked authority to modify it absent a finding of
unreasonableness.183
In a recent Michigan case, however, the balance between
municipalities and the regulatory agency tilted the other way. Although
Michigan’s constitution reserves to local governments a power of
“reasonable control” of highways and streets, this control cannot be
exercised inconsistently with “general State law.”184 That general body
of law includes the legislatively-created Michigan Public Service
Commission (“MPSC”), which has “complete power and jurisdiction to
regulate all public utilities in the state except . . . as otherwise restricted
by law.”185 One of the MPSC’s rules requires the utility to bear the cost
of undergrounding “when required by local ordinances in congested
areas.”186
So when the City of Taylor, Michigan enacted an ordinance
requiring Detroit Edison to relocate its facilities underground during the
reconstruction of Telegraph Road—a major arterial highway—and the
utility disclaimed any obligation to pay, the courts had to decide what
effect to give to the MPSC regulation. Since local governments had
constitutional power to regulate streets (except as inconsistent with
general law) and the MPSC had statutory power to regulate utilities
(except as restricted by law), the dispute fell into an uncharted area. Did
the local governments’ power over streets trump an inconsistent rule by
the MPSC, or did the MPSC’s power to regulate utilities trump an
inconsistent city ordinance?
The lower courts held for the city, reasoning that the state had not
completely occupied “the field regarding a municipality’s authority over
the location of power lines, or the allocation of related costs.”187 But the
Id. at 304–05.
Id. at 308; see also Complaint by Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. against the City of Manitowoc,
2008 Wisc. PUC LEXIS 239, *9 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisc. Apr. 18, 2008) (explaining that
state utility commission had jurisdiction to review city ordinance that effectively required
utility to relocate facilities in public street, but the ordinance was presumptively reasonable
and the burden was on the utility to show otherwise).
184
MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 28; City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 715 N.W.2d 28, 32–33
(Mich. 2006) (citing People v. McGraw, 150 N.W. 836, 837 (Mich. 1915)).
185
City of Taylor, 715 N.W.2d. at 33.
186
In re City of Taylor, Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case No. U-15234, 2008 Mich PSC
LEXIS 15, *19.
187
City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 689 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Mich. App. 2004).
182
183
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Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, holding that it was up to the MPSC,
not the courts, to decide if there was a conflict between the rule and the
ordinance. If there was a conflict, the rule would prevail.188
In the end, the MPSC decided that its rule “entirely supplanted local
control over undergrounding electrical facilities” and the provision
allowing for local undergrounding ordinances in congested areas was a
It then remanded the matter to the
“narrow exception.”189
administrative law judge for factual findings as to whether the affected
stretch of road was a congested area within the rule’s meaning.190
3.

The Results of the “Regulated Utility” Cases

Courts have rejected utilities’ efforts to use their tariffs to shift
relocation costs to the government in contravention of the longstanding
common law rule when the relocation is of like kind. This result makes
sense. As noted in Section I.E., when a telephone or electric utility gets
to use the public right-of-way at little or no cost, the quid pro quo is that
the utility must move its facilities as required to accommodate other
public needs.
In the City of Taylor case, for example, there would have been no
conflict with MPSC rules had the city required Detroit Edison to replace
its aerial lines with other aerial lines in a different location to allow for
widening of the road. If there were a like-kind relocation order and the
utility invoked some vaguely-worded tariff to resist it, the outcome
probably would have paralleled the Ninth Circuit’s City of Auburn
decision.191 The tariff cannot be ambiguous; it must clearly state that it
will apply to government-ordered relocation of facilities in the public
right-of-way. That clear statement would put everyone on notice that
the utility meant to change the rules, thereby permitting public debate of
the issue and an informed decision by the state regulatory agency. Only
if the agency approved this clearly disclosed change would a court have
to decide whether the agency had the power to alter the common or
statutory law on the subject.
When the government orders a utility to put aerial wires
underground, however, a different issue arises. This order is not just a
simple relocation—it directs the use of a different (and more expensive)
kind of facility. If aerial lines were acceptable before, why are they not
acceptable now? The change might be needed for safety reasons, and if

188
189
190
191
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City of Taylor, 715 N.W. 2d at 33.
In re City of Taylor, 2008 Mich PSC LEXIS at *19.
Id. at *34.
See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text (discussing the City of Auburn decision).
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so, it would be within the scope of governmental police power. But if
the change is for aesthetic reasons, the governmental agency likely will
have to pay for it.192
C. Statutory Abrogation Cases
Statutes can, of course, displace the common law, but courts
ordinarily hold that the legislative intent to do so must be clearly
expressed or necessarily implied.193 Statute-based challenges to the
common law rule on utility relocation typically come in two forms,
predicated on either the original franchise statute under which the
company laid its lines or a statute allowing payment of relocation
costs.194
In the first category, Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler is
representative.195 As it happened, Qwest had telephone facilities on
public roadways in Arizona pursuant to a territorial statute, enacted in
1877, that allowed it to build and maintain equipment “from point to
point, upon and along any of the public roads or highways.”196 Based on
this statute, Qwest convinced the trial court that its “pre-statehood
franchise granted it a property right and that it was not required to pay
its own relocation costs.”197 The appeals court disagreed, for three main
reasons.

192
This issue is still being litigated in various jurisdictions. The city of Reynoldsburg,
Ohio, for example, adopted an ordinance requiring utilities to pay for undergrounding
their lines as part of a project to revamp its main commercial corridor. State ex rel.
Columbus S. Power Co. v. Fais, 884 N.E.2d 1, 1–5 (Ohio 2008). This ordinance conflicted
with an approved tariff which specified that if a public authority ordered undergrounding,
it would have to pay the portion of the cost that exceeded construction of standard
facilities. Id. The city challenged this tariff in court, arguing that its cost-shifting provision
violated a state statute by being “in excess of that allowed by law.” Id. at 5. But the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the utilities commission, not the court, had jurisdiction to decide
the matter. Id. The case is currently pending before Ohio’s utilities commission. City of
Reynoldsburg v. Columbus S. Power Co., PUCO, No. 08-0846-EL-CSS, 2008 WL 5069035, at
*1 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n, Nov. 24, 2008).
193
See, e.g., Do v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.W.2d 853, 859 (Minn. 2010) (quoting
Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000) (“[I]f a statute abrogates the common
law, the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary implication.”)).
194
See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that utilities have also argued that the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996
preempted state regulation of relocation costs). Since that statute includes a “safe-harbor
provision” that preserves “the authority of a State or local government to manage the public
rights-of-way,” challenges based on this statute have been unsuccessful. Id.
195
217 P.3d 424 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
196
Id. at 427.
197
Id.
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First, although the franchise statute allowed it to maintain lines from
point to point, this language did not clearly manifest an intention to
abrogate the common law.198 Instead, the court said that the “great
weight of authority” supported a rule that,
[i]n the absence of an express and definite provision to
the contrary, a utility company maintains its structures
and rights in a public street subject to the paramount
right of the city to use its streets for all proper
governmental purposes. A grant, franchise, easement or
other right . . . is at all times subject to the police power
of the sovereign, and unless expressly agreed otherwise in
the franchise, the company must, at its own expense, make
such changes as the public convenience and necessity
require . . . if the franchise is silent as to payment of the cost of
relocation of utilities, made necessary by public improvements,
the cost must be borne by the franchise holder.199
Second, the franchise statute specified that the utility equipment
“shall not in any instance be so constructed as to incommode the public
in the use of said roads or highways and bridges.”200 Qwest said this
requirement applied to the original installation only; if the
“incommoding” arose because of changes the government made to the
road, then the government should pay for the relocation. The appeals
court, however, rejected this argument, as courts uniformly do, holding
that the duty was a continuing one.201
Third, the court noted that “when the Arizona Legislature wants to
compensate utilities for their relocation costs, it has done so in
unmistakable terms,” giving as an example a statute that specifically
required a light rail project to reimburse a utility for relocation costs.202
Fortunately for the appeals court in City of Chandler, Arizona’s
relocation-cost statute for the light rail project was a model of clarity.
But that is not always so. In the Houston-area Westpark Tollway cases
described at the beginning of this Article, courts had to grapple with a
statute that required counties to pay for relocating “an eligible utility”
facility as part of the expense of acquiring right-of-way for the highway

Id. at 432.
Id. at 432 (quoting Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Seattle, 373 P.2d 133, 135 (Wash.
1962)).
200
Id. at 427.
201
Id. at 432–34.
202
Id. at 434.
198
199
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project, without defining what “eligible” meant.203 The federal court,
trying to determine what Texas law would be, examined some statutes
and concluded that the word “eligible” referred to costs.204 So, for
example, if the utility company installed better equipment in the new
location, the added cost of that betterment would not be eligible, but the
cost of the basic replacement would be.
In a later case, though, the Texas Supreme Court decided
otherwise.205 It held that the word “‘eligible’” simply signaled that in
some situations relocation costs might be paid by the county, but if so,
the duty would appear in other statutes that “clearly speak to the
subject.”206 One such statute, the court noted, was enacted in 1957 to
take advantage of federal cost reimbursement for utility relocation on
Interstate highway projects.207 But that statute’s scope was limited to
Interstate highways and, as the court was careful to point out, none of
the relocation cost would be paid by the state “if the relocation is not
eligible for Federal participation.”208
As the Texas court emphasized, “when the Legislature has
determined that the government should pay a utility’s relocation costs,
the statutes clearly delineate classes of relocations that are eligible for
reimbursement.”209 So although the county road law did indicate that
some facilities might be “eligible” for county-paid relocation, the
Tollway project was not part of the interstate system, and the utility
could not show any other clear statutory exception to the common law

203
See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text (discussing the Houston-area Westpark
Tollway cases).
204
Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec. LLC v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 436 F.3d 541, 547–
50 (5th Cir. 2006).
205
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2009).
206
Id. at 66–67. Southwestern Bell tried to turn this argument around, contending that
because some statutes explicitly required utilities to pay relocation costs but the telephone
franchise statute did not, then the government should pay for the relocation. Id. at 63. The
court disagreed, explaining that “the statute’s silence on relocation costs would mean that
the common law rule applied, not that the county was responsible for relocation costs.” Id.;
cf. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 329 P.2d 289, 291–92 (Cal. 1958) (explaining that
because the county franchise specifying gas company’s duty to relocate pipes in the event
of a grade change was not a restriction, pipes had to be relocated for sewer project
pursuant to common law rule).
207
See supra Part I.C.3 (providing a discussion on highway legislation during the 1950s).
208
Sw. Bell., 282 S.W.3d. at 65–66; cf. Artesian Water Co. v. Delaware, 330 A.2d 432, 436–
37 (Del. Sup. 1974) (the common law rule controls absent a statute to the contrary). Under
Delaware law, the state is obligated to pay for utility relocation costs only when they are
incurred as a result of a federal-aid project in which the federal share is at least ninety
percent. Id. On the project in question, the federal share was only fifty percent so the state
was “prohibited under the statute from defraying Artesian’s relocation expenses.” Id.
209
Sw. Bell, 282 S.W.3d at 67.
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rule making its facilities eligible.210 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the common law rule applied.211
D. “Takings” Cases
Despite more than a century of case law holding that a utility does
not have a compensable property right in the particular locations where
its facilities are installed,212 utilities routinely advance a takings
argument and courts routinely reject it.213 As discussed in Section I.B.,
there is an important difference between a utility’s franchise rights and
the location of its facilities within the public right-of-way. If a utility has
franchise rights, they cannot be taken without just compensation, but the
actions it takes in exercising those rights, such as the location of its
facilities, can be regulated under the police power.
Sometimes, however, a utility does have a compensable property
interest in an easement that predates the public right-of-way. A good
illustration of this circumstance arose when telephone lines had to be
relocated for the construction of a scenic parkway leading to the Great
Smoky Mountains National Park. A total of forty-three utility poles and
the associated lines had to be relocated and of these, five had been
installed within a county highway right-of-way.214 With regard to those
five poles the utility had no right to compensation, for
the law is well established that a statutory, permissive
right of use of public highways by public utilities is
subordinate to the rights of the public; that the original
location of poles or other facilities in a public highway
does not create an irrevocable right to have such poles
and facilities remain forever in the same place; and that
a utility company may be required to relocate its lines at
its own expense when such relocation is demanded by
public necessity and for public safety and welfare.215

Id.
Id. at 67.
212
See, e.g., New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453,
461 (1905) (holding that “[t]he gas company did not acquire any specific location in the
streets” by virtue of its franchise to use the streets to lay gas pipes).
213
See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler, 217 P.3d 424, 437 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting New Orleans Gaslight to negate utility’s contention that it had suffered a taking
when compelled to pay its own relocation costs).
214
Tennessee v. United States, 256 F.2d 244, 263–64 (6th Cir. 1958).
215
Id. at 258.
210
211
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The right of the state to order relocation, moreover, was not affected by
its conveyance of the highway land to the federal government, for there
was no “sound reason why the state’s police power should not be
exercised in conjunction with the [federal] government’s right of eminent
domain.”216
With regard to the other thirty-eight poles, however, the utility was
entitled to reimbursement, because they were installed on private land
two years before the county acquired a wider and longer right-of-way
that included most of them.217 So while the state could order these
facilities to be moved, it did have to pay for the relocation.218
III. THE DIFFICULT NEXUS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT ACTION AND PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT
In years past, governments all too often handled infrastructure needs
on a reactive basis. A developer, for example, might open up a large
housing subdivision on what had been a quiet rural road. As more and
more houses were built in the subdivision, traffic on the road would
increase. Eventually, there would be demands to improve the road to
handle the increased traffic, and the city or county would respond by
widening the road, adding turn lanes and signals, and improving the
intersections. If utilities occupying the existing road right-of-way had to
move, it would be at their cost.
As time went on, however, governments became more proactive.
Instead of waiting for the road to bog down in traffic, a local government
might first require the developer to study what off-site infrastructure
improvements would be needed as the development built out. Then, it
might require the developer to pay for or make those off-site
improvements as a condition to getting needed governmental approval
for the subdivision.219 This practice of assessing impact fees or exactions
as a condition of land-use permitting has been the focus of much
litigation, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. For
Id. at 257.
Id. at 262–64. If the highway easement was there first, and the utility later acquired its
own easement in the same area, the common law rule should still apply because the utility
easement would be subordinate. City of Perrysburg v. Toledo Edison Co., 870 N.E.2d 189,
196 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
218
Tennessee, 256 F.2d at 262–64.
219
See, e.g., David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart Growth:
Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 353–55 (2007); Laurie Reynolds and
Carlos A. Ball, The Law & Politics of Local Governance, Exactions and the Privatization of the
Public Sphere, 21 J.L. & POL. 451, 464 (2005); Nicole M. Lugo, Comment, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: Paving New Bicycle Paths Through the Thickets of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause,
48 ARK. L. REV. 823, 831 (1995).
216
217
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our purposes, it is sufficient to note that governments sometimes require
developers to undertake or finance upgrades to nearby roads and other
infrastructure that will be impacted by their developments.220 And when
this happens, utilities within the existing public right-of-way may be
forced to relocate, raising a potentially difficult question: who should
pay for the relocation, the utility or the developer?
A. Road Widening as a Condition of a Development Permit
In the early 1980s, Dame Construction Company applied for
approval to develop 715 homes on a 417-acre site in Contra Costa
County, California. The county board of supervisors approved the
application with several conditions, one of which required Dame to
widen the portion of San Ramon Valley Boulevard next to the
development site.221 This widening project would require Pacific Gas
and Electric (“PG&E”) to relocate a distribution line on that road, which
PG&E declined to do without Dame’s promise to pay for it. Dame
refused to promise anything and went ahead with construction, leaving
PG&E’s poles and lines in the middle of the newly paved road.222 At that
point, PG&E moved its poles and sued Dame to recover the cost.223
Dame advanced three reasons why the common law utility rule
should apply and require PG&E to pay for the relocation. First, Dame
said that even though it undertook and paid for the road widening, the
project had to be treated as a “governmental act” because it was a
condition imposed by the county government. As Dame contended, “it
is a common practice for local governments to impose conditions on
developers requiring various work to be done as a means of obtaining
public improvements at private expense.”224 Even so, however, the court
found that Dame’s development “contributed to the need for
widening . . . the road, and the work was performed and paid for by
Dame, not the county.”225 Accordingly, it did not consider Dame’s work
to be a governmental act.
Second, Dame argued that because the county would have had to
widen the road eventually, it should “therefore stand in the shoes of the
220
See, e.g., McClung v. City of Sumner, 545 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding city
ordinance requiring new, permitted developments to upgrade size of storm water drains).
221
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Dame Constr. Co., Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 351, 352–53 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987).
222
Id.
223
The county would not have been liable in any event, as its subdivision development
agreement with Dame required Dame to pay “all costs of the work, including inspections
thereof and relocating existing utilities required thereby.” Id. at 357 (emphasis omitted).
224
Id. at 354.
225
Id.
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government, which does not have to bear the costs of utility location.”226
But the court put the burden back on Dame, finding that its “private
development at least accelerated the need for the public improvement,
thereby providing the nexus which justified imposition of all of the costs
thereof on the developer.”227
Finally, Dame emphasized that it was the county that asked PG&E to
move the poles, arguing that under the common law rule, a utility must
pay for relocation whenever requested to do so by the government
agency that controls the road.228 In fact, the county did send a set of
plans for the road-widening project to PG&E and asked the company to
“make arrangements” to relocate its poles accordingly.229 But the
county’s letter said nothing about who should pay for the relocation, and
that fact, to the court, was at least as important as the fact that the county
had directed its request to PG&E.230
Based on these findings, the court concluded that the common law
rule did not apply. To craft a solution, it turned to an economic analysis
for guidance. Should the relocation cost be borne by PG&E’s ratepayers
generally, or should it be borne by Dame, whose subdivision residents
will most directly benefit from the road-widening project?231 It decided
that allocating the cost to the beneficiary of the project would be the most
equitable solution, “regardless whether the beneficiary is deemed to be
the developer or a segment of the public.”232
To begin with, the court felt that although the general public would
benefit from the road widening, the primary beneficiary was the
developer, “which would not have been permitted to develop its land
without agreeing to widen the adjacent boulevard. Since Dame
presumably enjoys the economic opportunity that the development
represents, it seems proper that it should also bear the attendant
costs.”233 And while Dame argued that the county planned to widen the
road anyway, the evidence did not indicate that the road project would
have been done had Dame’s subdivision not been approved.234
But even if the general public was the main beneficiary of the
improvement, the court still felt justified in allocating the cost to Dame.
As the court explained:
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 354–55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 354–56.
Id. at 355–56.
Id. at 356.
Id.
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[t]he members of the public who will benefit most from
the road widening will be those who reside closest to it
and most regularly contribute to traffic upon the
widened segment. As it appears most of these persons
will be living in houses purchased from Dame, Dame is
able to and almost certainly will pass on the costs of the
improvement, including the expense of relocating the
poles, to these residual beneficiaries.235
The Maryland Court of Appeals faced a similar situation when
Montgomery County required a developer to widen an adjacent road as
a condition of approval for a residential development.236 According to
the court, the common law utility relocation rule normally “involved
situations in which the relocation is required because of changes in the
right-of-way made necessary by public works projects of one kind or
another and the utility seeks compensation from the public authority for
the cost of relocation.”237 In the case before it, by contrast, the relocation
was required for a private development and would work to the
economic benefit of a private developer.238 After considering Dame
Construction and other cases, the Maryland court concluded that
[w]hether we adopt a benefit analysis as the California
court did or simply hold . . . that, where the relocation is
triggered and made necessary by a private development,
the common law rule does not apply and the developer
must pay the cost of the relocation, is not likely to make
much difference. The end result under either approach
will, in almost all instances, be the same. The automatic
rule is the easier to apply and avoids the prospect of
extensive litigation and endless discovery over who,
among any number of possible parties, may be the
principal beneficiary of particular road improvements
occasioned by a private development. Largely for that
reason, we shall adopt [the automatic rule] . . . . We find
no legal basis, and certainly no equitable one, for
requiring a utility’s rate-paying customers to bear a cost
triggered and made necessary by a private developer’s

235
236
237
238
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Id.
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Classic Cmty. Corp., 856 A.2d 660, 662 (Md. 2004).
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project and thus, in effect, to subsidize the cost of the
development.239
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit essentially
adopted the Maryland court’s “triggering” approach, holding that a road
improvement project—undertaken by a private developer as a condition
of governmental approval of a multi-use development in Little Rock—
was outside the scope of the common law rule.240 As the court noted, the
road was needed to accommodate increased traffic from a commercial
development and the private developers were the driving force behind
the development.241 Although the developers argued that the road
project was “dictated by the city for the benefit of the public,” the city
had no imminent plan for construction and, significantly, the city had
actually changed its long-term plan for the road location to
accommodate the developers’ wishes.242 While the road project might
have accomplished a governmental purpose, it was not a governmental
act, leading the court to decide that the common law utility relocation
rule did not apply.243
B. Road Widening Mandated by Legislation
Unlike the development-permit cases, a “governmental act” will be
found when the road project has been mandated by a legislative act. The
City of Bridgeton, Missouri wanted to improve Taussig Road for many
years but lacked the funding to do it.244 An opportunity came with the
development of an industrial park in a neighboring community. The
industrial park needed a highway interchange, part of which would be
in Bridgeton, and the Missouri Department of Transportation required
the park’s developer to get approval of the interchange from all the
municipalities that would be affected by it. Bridgeton agreed to give its
approval in return for the developer’s agreement to help pay for the
Taussig Road project.245 Four years later, when the Taussig Road project
was ready for construction, a dispute arose regarding relocation of water
lines belonging to the Missouri-American Water Company.
The first legal problem was the expiration of the utility’s franchise to
maintain its lines in the public right-of-way. Both sides, however, had
239
240
241
242
243
244
245

Id. at 669.
Whisenhunt v. Sw. Bell Tel., 573 F.3d 565, 568–69 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 568–69.
Id.
City of Bridgeton v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 219 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Mo. 2007).
Id.
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continued to act as if the franchise was still in force. Accordingly, the
court decided that the parties were operating under an implied contract,
having the same terms as the original franchise and terminable upon
reasonable notice.246
The court then turned to relocation costs and, since the original
franchise said nothing about it, decided that the common law rule would
govern.247 The water company emphasized the role that private
development was playing, arguing that the industrial park developer
had agreed to pay for the Taussig Road project four years before the city
council legislatively declared the project to be a public purpose.248 To the
Missouri Supreme Court, however, the timing was irrelevant:
The purpose of the Taussig Road project was for the
legislative body to determine. The Court respects that
authority and normally does not look behind such
legislative determinations. There is no evidence in the
record that could establish any arbitrary and
unreasonable acts on the part of Bridgeton sufficient to
constitute abuse of the legislative process.249
And since the city council had established by resolution that public
necessity required relocating the water company’s facilities in the
Taussig Road right-of-way, the court held that the company had to do
the work at its own expense.250
In reaching this decision, the Missouri Supreme Court expressed no
opinion on the validity of an earlier Missouri appellate decision that
required developers to pay to relocate utilities when improving roads
under governmentally-imposed conditions on land-use permits.251 The
court distinguished that decision, however, because in the earlier case
“there was no legislative determination that the primary purpose of the
project was a public one.”252 Ironically, the industrial park development
would add little traffic to Taussig Road.253 While that fact would have
given the industrial park developer a solid basis to contest the Taussig

Id. at 232.
Id.
248
Id. at 233.
249
Id. (citations omitted).
250
Id.
251
Id. at 233 n.3 (citing Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis v. St. Louis Cnty. Water
Co., 784 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
252
Id.
253
Id. at 239.
246
247
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Road project had it been imposed as a permit condition,254 in the
Missouri Supreme Court’s view it also served to distinguish the earlier
appellate case where “the actions of private developers triggered the
need for the road improvements.”255
C. Considering the Issues Raised by the “Private Development” Cases
Dame Construction Company made a valid point: once there was
enough new development in the area, the county would have had to
widen San Ramon Valley Boulevard anyway. The court’s response—
that Dame’s development “at least accelerated the need for the public
improvement”—was not really an answer.256 Any new development that
generated traffic would have accelerated the need to widen the road.
And because Dame was standing in the county’s shoes for purposes of
widening the road, why should it not also stand in the county’s shoes for
purposes of utility relocation?
But PG&E also had a valid point. If its electric lines had been on
private land, Dame would have had to pay to relocate them. Since the
relocation is part and parcel of a private development project, why
should the outcome be any different for the lines that PG&E had been
allowed to install on public right-of-way? Why should one private
business (Dame) get the benefit of the state’s police power to order
relocation at the expense of another private business (PG&E)? Similar
concerns lay underneath the argument about “proprietary” government
activities257 and the negative reaction to use of eminent domain power to
acquire property for private development.258
Neither the “benefit” nor the “triggering event” approach, however,
provides a satisfactory way to distinguish privately motivated projects
from truly public works. As the Maryland Court of Appeals pointed out,
254
See Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis, 784 S.W.2d at 289 (“[The government
agencies] have taken the position that an exaction requiring each of the Developers to
construct these right-of-way improvements is justified because they are reasonably related
to each Developer’s project. No Developer has objected that such exaction was unlawful.”).
The Taussig Road project was not a permit-related exaction, however; the city gave its
support for a highway interchange in return for the developer’s agreement to fund the road
project. Id.
255
City of Bridgeton, 219 S.W.3d at 233 n.3.
256
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Dame Constr. Co., Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 351, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987).
257
See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Classic Cmty. Corp., 856 A.2d 660, 667–69 (Md.
2004) (likening a relocation that is made necessary by the actions of a private developer to
one caused by a municipality acting in a proprietary capacity).
258
See, e.g., Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain’s “Summer of Scrutiny”,
59 ALA. L. REV. 561, 562−64 (2008) (discussing the public and legislative backlash against
the Supreme Court’s June 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
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it is difficult to quantify who benefits how much from a road project.
Focusing on the benefit to the development that set the project in motion
ignores future benefits. After the road is widened, every existing and
subsequent development along the road will receive the benefit of the
project, and property owners on intersecting roads might benefit, too. In
addition, the “benefit” approach can reach projects directly undertaken
by the government.259 Furthermore, while someone on the other side of
the county may not benefit directly from a particular road, it is equally
true that someone without children may not benefit directly from a
public school. Yet both road and school systems are legitimate public
works projects.
The “triggering event” approach is equally unhelpful. Most of the
real estate development in this country is private, and it is this private
activity that generates the traffic that needs the roads. In the Dame
Construction case, the proposed subdivision was fairly large, involving
715 homes. So, the traffic it produced on its own might have exceeded
the design capacity of the existing road. But a series of small
developments could have produced the same result, even though each of
them, taken individually, might not have added enough traffic to justify
the widening project or produced enough revenue for the developer to
afford it. It is almost always private development, individually or in the
aggregate, that triggers the need for a road project, but if a single
development is large enough and the traffic impact great enough, the
government might require the developer to pay for or undertake the
project now instead of using tax money to pay for it later.
Perhaps the better test is the one used by the Missouri Supreme
Court in City of Bridgeton.260 The Missouri court focused on the role that
Bridgeton’s city council played in the project, both presuming that the
council acted regularly and using an abuse of discretion standard to
review its actions. The following is a more general application of the test
used in City of Bridgeton.
If the government authority responsible for the road has, by
legislation or equivalent administrative act, mandated that the project be
built or declared that it is undertaken for a public purpose, then the
project should be considered a governmental one for relocation-cost
purposes. Accordingly, the utility would have to pay to relocate the
259
See, e.g., Complaint by Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. against the City of Manitowoc, 2008
Wisc. PUC LEXIS 239, *3–4, *10 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisc. Apr. 18, 2008) (“The record
amply demonstrates that the City was engaged in legitimate city improvement projects that
reasonably required WPSC to permanently relocate. In addition, WPSC has not
demonstrated that the Paul Road improvement project was substantially for the benefit of a
third party.”).
260
See supra Part III.B (discussing City of Bridgeton).
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facilities it had installed in the public right-of-way, unless it can show
that the government abused its discretion by undertaking or legislatively
supporting the project.
Alternatively, if the government has not taken such affirmative steps
in support of the project, and has simply made it a prerequisite to
approval of a private development, then its concern is primarily with the
development’s impact on infrastructure. In that setting, the officially
expressed public interest in the project is attenuated, so it could properly
be considered a private action in which utility relocation costs should be
paid by the developer.
IV. THE USE OF A “CLEAR STATEMENT” REQUIREMENT IN DECIDING
CHALLENGES TO THE COMMON LAW RELOCATION RULE
As the foregoing analysis has shown, the common law rule that
“utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a
public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local
authorities” is remarkably well-established.261 The U.S. Supreme Court
approved it in 1905, reaffirmed it in 1983, and almost every state in the
nation has adopted it.262
This nearly universal support is not surprising, for the rule is
founded on a significant public policy consideration: governments have
a paramount right and duty to use their police powers to control the
public’s vital assets—its streets and highways—for the public good.
Allowing utilities to put poles, wires, and pipes in the public ways is an
important and valuable use, but those secondary purposes cannot
displace public control. If the rule is not followed, and the government
has to pay to relocate those subordinate occupants of the public space, it
would undermine public control and directly affect the government’s
ability to improve roads or develop other public uses. Accordingly, any
departure from the common law rule should not be lightly inferred.
When the Supreme Court considered the relocation-cost issue in
Norfolk Redevelopment, it began with a clear statement rule: that a
common law principle “ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless

261
Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S.
30, 35 (1983).
262
N. States Power Co. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 358 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004) (calling
the common law utility-relocation rule “undisputed precedent”); City of Auburn v. Qwest
Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the rule has been followed in virtually
every jurisdiction except, possibly, Arkansas); BETH A. BUDAY & DENNIS JENSEN,
MCQUILLIN ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.74.10 (3d ed. 1995).
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the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose.”263 The
Court noted that while this often-invoked canon of statutory
construction is not always given much weight, it had greater force in the
context of utility relocation because federal eminent domain law is
largely derived from the common law.264
We have also seen that the purpose of the common law utilityrelocation rule is to avoid inadvertently blocking or impeding a state or
local government’s exercise of the police power over the streets and
public ways. It is not just an ordinary part of the common law; it is a
rule that conserves the government’s fundamental power over public
assets. To be sure, a state government can decide to cede some of that
power by paying to relocate utilities using the public right-of-way. But
because the common law rule is so broadly recognized, and is founded
on such important public policy considerations, there is no room for
doubt. A court must be convinced that the legislature really meant to
shift responsibility for relocation costs from the utility to the public.
Accordingly, the common law rule should be given strong presumptive
weight, similar to the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of
statutes,265 so that the statute would be read narrowly to avoid any
conflict with it.266
263
Norfolk Redevelopment, 464 U.S. at 35–36 (quoting Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee,
7 Cranch 603, 623 (1813)).
264
Id. at 36.
265
See, e.g., Honulik v. Town of Greenwich, 980 A.2d 845, 849–50 (Conn. 2009) (citing
State v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986, 992 (Conn. 1994)) (“[W]e begin with a strong presumption
of constitutionality. . . . we read the statute narrowly in order to save its constitutionality,
rather than broadly in order to destroy it. We will indulge in every presumption in favor of
the statute’s constitutionality.”).
266
The New Jersey Supreme Court gave a narrow construction to that state’s relocationcost statute in the context of a road widening undertaken by a private developer. The
statute requires the state to pay for utility relocations on any “highway project,” which is
defined as a project “administered and contracted for” by the state’s Commissioner of
Transportation. Pine Belt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 626 A.2d 434,
436 (N.J. 1993) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7 (West 1984)). New Jersey Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) made Pine Belt Chevrolet widen part of a public highway as a
condition of a driveway permit, and this widening displaced some utility poles. Jersey
Central Power contended that the statute had entirely abrogated the common law rule. But
the court, carefully analyzing the statute’s terms, concluded that it applied only to projects
that the DOT contracted for and administered. Since the DOT ordered (but did not itself
undertake) the widening project, the court held that common law rule still applied. Id. at
443.
The court also concluded that the cost should not be shifted to the Chevrolet
dealership. In this regard, it noted that New Jersey’s highway access management
regulations categorized the road widening as a capacity improvement benefiting the entire
motoring public rather than an improvement benefiting the permit applicant only (like a
dedicated turn lane or traffic signal). Id. at 445. This administrative classification
convinced the court that the widening project had a public purpose. The court then
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When construing an act by a local government, such as a local
franchise agreement with a utility, the inquiry would take on a second
step. First, did the local government clearly assume responsibility for
relocation costs? Second, did the state legislature clearly allow the local
government to do this?267 In the regulatory context, assuming a state’s
utility commission has the power to enact regulations or approve tariffs
contrary to local legislation, the same question should be asked. Does
this tariff (or regulation) on utility relocation expressly state that it
applies to governments? If it does, then a court can be assured that, after
the appropriate notice and public comment process, the utility
commission knowingly decided to shift the burden of relocation costs to
the local government.
Had the Fifth Circuit used a clear statement rule, it would have
avoided a ten million dollar mistake about the meaning of Texas law in
the Westpark Tollway case.268 Once it determined that the utility was
claiming reimbursement for relocation costs under a statute that was
ambiguous,269 the inquiry would have ended, and the court would have
applied the common law rule as the Texas Supreme Court later did.270
Instead, the court decided to “look to other sources”271 to find the
meaning, and those sources gave it the wrong answer.
This Article began with the observation that courts are sometimes
reluctant to apply the common law utility relocation rule, perhaps
because it seems like an outdated historical artifact or an uncompensated
taking of private property. But as we have seen, the public policy
concluded that “[l]iability for the costs of relocations necessitated by highway
improvements that further the public welfare is a risk the utility companies run and a price
they must pay for the privilege of locating within a public right-of-way.” Id.
267
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 273 (1908). The Supreme
Court stated that
the State may authorize one of its municipal corporations to establish,
by an inviolable contract, the rates to be charged by a public service
corporation (or natural person) for a definite term, not grossly
unreasonable in point of time, and that the effect of such a contract is
to suspend, during the life of the contract, the governmental power of
fixing and regulating the rates. But for the very reason that such a
contract has the effect of extinguishing pro tanto an undoubted power
of government, both its existence and the authority to make it must
clearly and unmistakably appear, and all doubts must be resolved in
favor of the continuance of the power.
Id. (citations omitted).
268
Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec. LLC v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 436 F.3d 541, 542
(5th Cir. 2006).
269
See id. at 545 (“[W]e have examined the statute, as noted above, and find that the
words ‘eligible utility facility’ remain ambiguous.”).
270
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 63–65 (Tex. 2009).
271
Centerpoint Energy, 436 F.3d at 545.
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concerns on which the rule is based are no less significant now than they
were in the late nineteenth century, and over a century of legal
precedents have consistently affirmed that a utility does not gain a
property right in the public places where it installs its equipment.
Instead, the utility accepts the benefit of using the public right-of-way in
return for undertaking the duty to move its equipment upon request by
the government.
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